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1 Introduction 
 
 This paper approaches the prospects for development studies by examining its 
shifting relationship to development economics. The latter’s own history is 
characterised in terms of its capture by economics imperialism over the period of the 
Washington Consensus and Post Washington Consensus in sections 2 and 3. The 
corresponding shift from the old to the new (and “newer”) development economics is 
associated with an increasing influence over development studies, especially through 
the growing role of the World Bank as knowledge bank. But, as argued in section 4, 
the dull and universal compulsion of what is dubbed zombieconomics is open to 
challenge from development studies in light of its multi-, even inter-, disciplinarity. 
Further, as suggested in section 5, the current intellectual environment of dual retreat 
from the extremes of both post-modernism and neo-liberalism, renewal of interest in 
the systemic nature of contemporary capitalism, and the increasing need to respond to 
the dysfunctions associated with financialisation, offer development studies the most 
favourable circumstances in which both to prosper and to outflank the designs of 
economics imperialism. The final section offers a heavily abbreviated illustration by 
reference to the evolving political economy of South Africa. 
 
 
2 From Economics to Economics Imperialism1 
 
 Whilst the history of development studies has been written a number of times 
and from a number of perspectives, the same is less true of development economics. 
In two respects, at least, this is remarkable for, first, development economics has 
changed beyond recognition within my own lifetime as an economist (and I am not so 
old). In addition, second, in violation of the law that history is written by the victors, 
most reflections on the evolution of development economics have originated from the 
vanquished, as it were, those who regret the direction it has taken and who wish to 
restore the methods, substance and pre-occupations of what has gone before and been 
discarded. In short, there is a new (and I might also refer to a newer and newest) 
development economics that is distinctive from and, in general, ignorant of the old or 
classic development economics as part and parcel of casual neglect of its own 
intellectual precursors.  
 
These are matters to which I will soon return but to do so it is first necessary 
to locate development economics within the broader scope of the discipline of 
economics itself for the two have gone from occupying parallel universes to being 
more or less synonymous with one another. It is also important to locate 
(development) economics in relation to other disciplines. And, unlike history itself, 
this can be done with the benefit of hindsight and by starting with the here and now 
and travelling backwards to reveal how we got where we are – although explanation 
for this is more challenging than description. 
 First and foremost, as a discipline, mainstream economics is increasingly 
subject to an esoteric and intellectually bankrupt technicism that is absolutely 
intolerant of alternatives and only allows for them to survive on its margins. The 
technical apparatus that this involves, utility and production functions, are well-
known to students of economics at every level of the discipline, as is the 
methodological focus of relying upon optimising individuals in single-minded pursuit 
of self-interest, embedded within formal mathematical models centred on (deviations 
from) efficiency and equilibrium, and reputedly tested against the evidence 
statistically. Despite its considerable and longstanding methodological and theoretical 
fragilities, especially from the perspectives of other social sciences, there is no sign 
that this situation of mono-economic dominance within the discipline is liable to 
change as a result of internally or externally generated critique. Indeed, mainstream 
economics continues to strengthen its stranglehold through research, publications and 
training with Americanisation to the fore. Insofar as there are disputes within 
economics, it is on the basis of very narrow differences across a much wider 
acceptance of core methods and techniques. 
 
Second, paradoxically then, the influence of economics on other social 
sciences is currently stronger than at any other time in the post-war period. This is a 
consequence of a new and virulent form of “economics imperialism” that takes neo-
liberalism as its point of departure. Emphasising that markets work well in general, it 
also accepts that the economy is subject to market imperfections, to which evolved 
institutional (or non-market) outcomes are the response (and which may themselves 
be subject to imperfection). But, in contrast to neo-liberalism, the mainstream can 
now claim that it takes history, culture, institutions into account seriously as joint, 
potentially favourable, determinants alongside the market. And this opens up the 
traditional subject matter of other social sciences as economists claim to be taking 
their concerns seriously albeit on their own methodological terms. 
 
This involves, on the one hand, an extraordinary reductionism of the social to 
informational or market imperfections and pursuit of self-interest while, on the other, 
considerable scope for inscribing (bringing back in) the social by plunder of concepts 
and insights from other social sciences (ranging from trust and customs to institutions, 
etc). But, within mainstream economics, despite the absolute dominance of 
methodological individualism in its current form and the widespread belief in the 
harmonious, if at times flawed, properties of free market capitalism, there is no 
unified ideology comparable to post-war Keynesianism (or, indeed, mid-nineteenth-
century free trade Ricardianism). Rather, orthodoxy is more a matter of adhering to 
technique and adopting a certain approach in resolving theoretical and empirical 
problems. As a result, both in popular and academic discourse, the diffuse nature of 
the new orthodoxy – its postures are contingent on the incidence and nature of market 
(and institutional) imperfections - makes challenges to it more difficult and less 
influential (unlike potential for unifying opposition to the challenge of neo-liberalism 
that is readily perceived as more or less narrow-minded dogma). 
 
Third, in the realm of methodology, the social sciences remain generally 
hostile to the methods and postures of mainstream economics, when they are 
explicitly confronted rather than informally incorporated. Nevertheless, rational 
choice adherents have made much headway in sociology, political science, history, 
and elsewhere. As a result, the depth, extent and nature of the influence of economics 
imperialism by topic and discipline are diverse, not least in light of continuing 
traditions, content and dynamics of the other social sciences. In addition, the openness 
of the other social sciences to economic arguments also reflects the current 
intellectual retreat across the social sciences from the excesses of both postmodernism 
and neo-liberalism, although the latter’s presence and continuing influence 
occasionally remain strong. Thus, the current intellectual environment is one in which 
the social sciences are more open to economic arguments in seeking to address the 
nature of contemporary capitalism. This also opens the way for economics 
imperialism. On the other hand, there is less appeal as far as other disciplines are 
concerned where the social and the systemic are genuinely taken as starting points, as 
in attention to relations, structures, conflict, power and critical attention to the 
meaning of concepts deployed, both to scholars and the objects of their scholarship 
(issues entirely unknown to mainstream economics and much political economy as 
well). 
 
Fourth, over the post-war period, economics began by being dominated by an 
uneasy analytical compromise between Keynesianism (and a concern with systemic 
behaviour in the limited form of orthodox macroeconomics) and general equilibrium 
theory and microeconomics (in which deviation from conditions for perfect 
competition might warrant intervention by a benevolent state). This compromise was 
rudely shattered by the collapse of the post-war boom and the emergence of a 
particularly virulent form of monetarism (the New Classical Economics) in which it 
was presumed that the state was at best ineffective and at worst a source of 
inefficiency. This all went hand in hand with strengthening the role of 
microeconomics (and methodological individualism) both within the discipline and in 
pushing the cruder and earlier forms of economics imperialism in which the non-
economic is understood not as the result of market (and institutional) imperfections 
but as the functioning of the market by other means as in public choice, property 
rights or human capital theory. 
 
During the Keynesian period, mainstream economics had retained some idea 
of the limitations on the scope of application of both its macro and micro principles, 
within economics itself let alone in extension to other disciplines. This left some 
considerable scope and respect for applied economics to prosper with empirically 
rooted inductive analysis to the fore across a range of topics that seemed to lie outside 
the domain of mainstream economic theory. In today’s world, such analysis has been 
displaced by new theoretical fields, and empirical methods, as in the new institutional 
economics, the new growth theory, the new economic geography, and the new 
welfare economics, in which market and institutional imperfections are now used to 
substitute universal theoretical principles for empirical investigation other than 
through statistical testing.  
 
In short, the new form of economics imperialism and the economic theory on 
which it is based, with emphasis on market and institutional imperfections, can be 
caricatured as “zombieconomics”, Fine (2008a). This is because is it both alive and 
dead at the same time. It is alive in the sense of not only aggressively and crudely, if 
not savagely, occupying its own territory and subject matter to the exclusion and 
absorption of competing paradigms but also through its increasing appetite for the 
flesh of other disciplines that it both infects and converts to its own nature with only 
limited traces remaining of what has been destroyed. By the same token, it is 
intellectually dead, having nothing new to offer other than parasitic extension of its 
principles to new applications.  
 
3 From Pre- to Post-Washington Consensus 
 
This brief overview of the history of the discipline in general does itself offer 
insights into the evolution of development economics in particular. For sake of 
convenience, I divide the evolution of development economics into three periods. The 
last two are familiar and recent enough to be instantly recognised and also to have 
been, in a limited way, heavily debated. They are those associated with the 
Washington Consensus and the Post Washington Consensus, PWC. Their 
correspondence with broader disciplinary changes are more or less immediate. As a 
product of the 1980s, the Washington Consensus is a reflection of the rise of neo-
liberalism and the analytical pre-occupation with the pursuit of self-interest, most 
obviously in terms of the notion of rent-seeking and, subsequently, corruption and 
governance especially in the wake of the problems posed by the transition economies. 
Development economics for the Washington Consensus is simply the application of 
the crude, non-market as if market, economics imperialism to the field, and gave rise 
to what has since been termed the new development economics in which formalism 
also played an increasing role. By the same token, the PWC is based on what I like to 
term the newer development economics since it applies the (market and institutional 
imperfection) information-theoretic approach to development with Stiglitz to the fore. 
 
 With the shift over the past decade from one Consensus to another, it is natural 
to understand the old development economics as constituting part of a pre-
Washington Consensus. This too can be pinpointed in terms of its location within the 
earlier character of economics as a discipline. As a specific field, it is generally 
recognised to have emerged after the second world war as a response to 
decolonisation. As a result, it is not surprising that it should stand apart in method and 
content from the theoretical designs of standard micro and macro, as did other applied 
and historical fields. The old development economics was concerned with how 
economic rationality could become adopted within developing economies (thereby 
accepting that all behaviour is not necessarily rational) and how broad economic and 
social transformation could be brought about, especially through the agency of the 
state. Toye (1993, p. 30-31) describes the old development economics in the 
following terms: 
 
The original theory of socioeconomic development that accompanied the post-
1945 decolonization of Asia and Africa rested on the idea of modern society 
as the goal of development. Modern society supposedly had typical social 
patterns of demography, urbanization and literacy; typical economic patterns 
of production and consumption, investment, trade and government finance; 
and typical psychological attributes of rationality, ascriptive identity and 
achievement motivation. The process of development consisted, on this 
theory, of moving from traditional society, which was taken as the polar 
opposite of the modern type, through a series of stages of development – 
derived essentially from the history of Europe, North America and Japan - to 
modernity, that is, approximately the United States of the 1950s. 
 
Thus, the old development economics was concerned with broad socio-economic 
processes and structural change as opposed to a theory of choice based on economic 
rationality. By the same token, the old development economics was inductive rather 
than deductive, seeking out empirical regularities in the transition from traditional to 
transitional society. And, in conformity to the hegemonic Keynesianism of the time, 
the old development economics laid considerable emphasis on the role of the state as 
agent of change (as opposed to focusing on the optimising behaviour of a 
representative individual). Such features of the old development economics are in part 
brought out by a commentary on Simon Kuznets, Nobel prize winner for economics 
and leading empiricist in the study of economic history and development. For Huff et 
al (2001, p. 719): 
 
Modern economic growth, Kuznets (1971, p. 346) points out, requires a 
modern nation state to serve as a clearing house for institutional innovations 
and to possess the ability to act as “an agency for resolution of conflicts 
among group interests; and as a major entrepreneur for the socially required 
infrastructure”. 
 
Such postures could not sit comfortably within the standard analysis of mainstream 
neo-classical economics. 
 
 Significantly, then, the rise of the old development economics had a close 
connection to economic history in subject matter and, especially, US personnel 
reflecting their location within economics departments and the continuing presence of 
those trained in the institutional tradition. This is most apparent in the work of 
possibly the most prominent of economic historians at the time, W. W. Rostow. His 
Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, emphasis added, carried a 
message to the world that could not be clearer in the wake of the launch of the 
Sputnik in 1957 and the perceived threat of Soviet economic and technological catch-
up. Whilst Rostow’s ideological credentials could not have been stronger in support 
of US hegemony, and his volume was to go through three editions and sell three 
hundred thousand copies, his own stance on economic history was not supportive of 
the single-minded theory and numbers characteristic of the emerging cliometric 
school. His schema for development followed a stylised induction of stages of 
economic growth from the experience of the developed countries. Whilst in part 
relying on standard growth theory, for Rostow, the ultimate causes of such growth are 
situated in a framework of modernisation, of breaking up of traditional societies and, 
correspondingly, of major shifts in political, cultural and social variables that are not 
reducible to the economic.  
 
This is a consequence of the established style of economic history to which 
Rostow adhered, but it also reflects a keen commitment to distance his approach from 
the “economic reductionism” that he attaches to Marxism. Indeed, his book’s last 
chapter is devoted to a critique of Marxism for its economic reductionism (making up 
15% or so of the main body of the text).2 The (mis)representation of Marx should not 
be taken too seriously except as a fascinating ideological text, reflecting (lack of) 
scholarly values of the time, but the nature of his construct of Marxism is instructive, 
Rostow (1991, p. 149):  
 
The first and most fundamental difference between the two analyses lies in the 
view taken of human motivation. Marx’s system is, like classical economics, a 
set of more or less sophisticated logical deductions from the notion of profit 
maximization. 
 
Ironically, this is a better description of the economics imperialism of the present day. 
For Rostow, by contrast: 
 
In the stages-of-growth sequence man is viewed as a more complex unit. He 
seeks, not merely economic advantage, but also power, leisure, adventure, 
continuity of experience and security; he is concerned with his family, the 
familiar values of his regional and national culture, and a bit of fun down at 
the local … In short, net human behaviour is seen not as an act of 
maximization, but as an act of balancing alternative and often conflicting 
human objectives in the face of the range of choices men perceive to be open 
to them. 
 
In short, from its own perspective, Rostow provides a manifesto of sorts more against 
neoclassical economics than Marxism by seeking to retain the notion of a more 
rounded individual. His antipathy to the idea that history can be reduced to the 
optimising individual could not be plainer, Rostow (1957, p. 514): 
 
The theorist has generally been uneasy if not awkward if forced to work 
outside Marshallian short-period assumptions; the historian – like the human 
beings he writes about – cannot avoid working in a world of changing tastes 
and institutions, changing population, technology, and capacity. 
 
In short, the old development economics carved a place for itself, like much 
applied economics more generally, outside the domain of both microeconomics and 
macroeconomics. In part, this reflected an acceptance that development was to be 
construed as something more than the economic as traditionally conceived, with a 
corresponding deference to the limited applicability of depending exclusively on 
“rationality” and needing to incorporate the insights and methods of the other social 
sciences. This all changed with the rise of the new development economics at the time 
of the collapse of the post-war boom and the rise to prominence of neo-liberal 
ideology. Heavily promoted by the IMF/World Bank inspired Washington Consensus, 
the new development economics emphasised the virtues of the market and the vices of 
the state in promoting economic development. But it did much more than this by 
incorporating development economics into the mainstream, with little or scant regard 
for the significance of non-economic factors (except as impediments to development). 
As Agénor and Montiel (1996, pp. 11-12) were to put it at a later stage: 
 
We do not believe that economic agents in developing countries behave 
differently from those in industrial economies, in ways that are inconsistent 
with the rational optimising principle of neoclassical microeconomics; rather, 
we believe that they behave similarly to their industrial counterparts, but 
operate in a different environment. 
 
In other words, economic principles are universal; only the environment in which they 
prevail is subject to variation. In this way, an establishment-driven challenge was 
made to both method and content of the old development economics. By driving to 
the extreme of neo-liberalism in ideology, policy, and scholarship, it provided the 
basis for a mild reaction against the idea that markets work perfectly whilst allowing 
those universal principles to be uncritically taken for granted.  
 
Most revealing in this respect is Rodrik’s (2007, p. 3) self-refection in a 
recently published collection of essays, bearing in mind that Rodrik is seen, like 
Stiglitz for example, as a fierce opponent of neo-liberalism and on the progressive 
side of the discipline of economics: 
 
First, this book is strictly grounded in neoclassical economic analysis. At the 
core of neoclassical economics lies the following methodological 
predisposition: social phenomena can best be understood by considering them 
to be an aggregation of purposeful behaviour by individuals – in their roles as 
consumer, producer, investor, politician, and so on – interacting with each 
other and acting under the constraints that their environment imposes. This I 
find to be not just a powerful discipline for organizing our thoughts on 
economic affairs, but the only sensible way of thinking about them. If I often 
depart from the consensus that “mainstream” economists have reached in 
matters of development policy, this has less to do with different modes of 
analysis than with different readings of the evidence and with different 
evaluations of the “political economy” of developing nations. The economics 
that the graduate student picks up in the seminar room – abstract as it is and 
riddled with a variety of market failures – admits an almost unlimited range of 
policy recommendations, depending on the specific assumptions the analyst is 
prepared to make. As I will argue in the chapters to come, the tendency of 
many economists to offer advice based on simple rules of thumb regardless of 
context (privatize this, liberalize that), is a derogation rather than a proper 
application of neoclassical economic principles. 
 
This, appropriately interpreted and rephrased, is a manifesto for zombieconomics in 
general and its dominance over development studies in particular.3 
 
In this light, the “newer” development economics does not fundamentally 
break with the methodology of the new (nor restore the old despite frequent claims to 
the contrary) even though it is more state-friendly and emphasises the significance of 
market imperfections. Rather, on the continuing basis of methodological 
individualism, it seeks to address (lack of) development in terms of market and 
institutional imperfections. Indeed, development becomes an ideal application for 
economics imperialism, with formal models of economic and social change and 
structure being subject to econometric testing. 
 
The result has been to collapse the distinctions between economics, economic 
history and development studies. In principle, this is no bad thing. It is essential that 
all three be studied together as development is irreducibly both economic and 
historical. But, in the hands of the newer development economists, both development 
and history provide the raw materials by which to provide narrative for the universal 
methodology of mainstream economics and data by which to test hypotheses. As 
already indicated, this can come in pure form of continuing to rely exclusively upon 
imperfectly informed and institutionalised but optimising individuals. One leading 
example is provided by Krugman (1992) whose mathematical models involving 
increasing returns to scale are perceived by himself to have rescued the old 
development economics from its technical deficiencies and lack of persuasion. That 
the classics might have rejected such methods rather than being incapable of them 
does not appear to occur to him. But this does serve a warning of the extent to which 
the newer economics imperialism both appropriates and distorts the content of what 
was once standard but is now perceived to be heterodox.4  
 
Significantly, Krugman deploys the same principles and methods to 
appropriate economic geography, explaining core and periphery relations and uneven 
development without reference at all to the role of the state let alone policymaking.5 
This is illustrative of the more general process of subsequently bringing back in on a 
selective basis what was first left out in establishing the technical apparatus of the 
mainstream. It is equally to be found in the new growth theory, the new institutional 
economics and so on. But it also goes hand in hand with marrying such pure use of 
the technical apparatus with other, more or less, arbitrary elements of the “irrational”, 
accepting for example that individuals may have other motives or be bound by 
exogenously given institutions. These range from freakonomics to neuroeconomics 
but also include the new economic sociology which more seriously and critically 
takes the technical apparatus as point of departure. Typical in so far as this is possible 
in an environment of such idiosyncrasy is the work of Bates et al (1998) in their 
Analytic Narratives. On the analytic side, there is little novelty other than the scope of 
the approach in covering both history and development, p. 8: 
 
Institutions … induce choices that are regularized because they are made in 
equilibrium … Behavior becomes stable and patterned, or alternatively 
institutionalized, not because it is imposed, but because it is elicited. 
 
But there is a wish to “blend rational choice analysis and narration”. Thus, “Our 
approach is narrative; it pays close attention to stories, accounts, and context. It is 
analytic in that it extracts explicit and formal lines of reasoning, which facilitates both 
exposition and explanation”, p. 10. It also “focuses on choices and decisions”, p. 13. 
But the narrative plays no analytical role, simply serving to determine which model or 
game should be considered to be appropriate and which equilibrium results. This is 
hardly a recipe for studying change, let alone endowing it with a genuine historical 
and developmental content. 
 
4 Twixt Development Economics and Studies 
 
 To a large extent, the previous account is deeply rooted within the evolution of 
development economics to what should be its familiar current state and prospects. But 
the view from outside the field or from within development studies is very different 
but equally subject to change both on its own terms and in relationship to 
development economics. First and foremost, development studies has increasingly 
drawn upon, indeed has been formed out of, the study of development within 
disciplines as in the geography of development, the sociology of development, and so 
on. In this respect, it incorporates a range of methods and methodologies far wider 
than, and generally in opposition to, those offered by mainstream economics. Not 
surprisingly, the division between development studies and economics has tended to 
mirror the differences or hostile relations between the other social sciences and 
economics more generally around the validity or otherwise of methodological 
individualism of a special type and reliance upon more or less sophisticated statistical 
regressions.  
 
Second, this multidisciplinarity has provided the opportunity and motivation 
for, and often the actuality of, interdisciplinary study. Third, the range of topics 
studied is far, far broader than those that come under the rubric of development 
economics (although open to economics imperialism). Fourth, greater reliance upon 
inductive use of case study evidence (as opposed to statistical manipulation of large 
data sets) has meant that development studies has placed much greater emphasis upon 
specificity, context and meaning as opposed to ignoring these or taking them as 
unproblematic. This has, in the extremes of postmodernism, allowed critical theory to 
be exclusively concerned with the deconstruction of the meaning of concepts as 
opposed to attaching the generation of those meanings to (the study of) material 
practices themselves. This has to some extent conceded the terrain around analysis of 
material practices (including policy) to those who are entirely without critical 
sensibilities in the postmodern and, often, any other sense. But this is not inevitable, 
universal nor, I would suggest, unchallenged, and the balance across these issues is 
shifting unevenly and variously across the social sciences. Indeed, whilst the rush 
from one post-ism to another continues to prevail, the increasing significance of 
attempts to come to grips with the material and the critical is one of the most marked 
and encouraging intellectual developments around the turn of the millennium. Fifth, 
the presence of critical scholarship within the constituent disciplines of development 
studies, and within development studies itself, has been married to a more aggressive 
motivation around the object of study, ranging from the wish to do good (or better) 
through to systemic critique. Of course, these are not absent in development 
economics but they are of a much lesser degree of depth and breadth, almost 
inevitably as a result of the method and substance of what is involved. To put it 
polemically, if you were genuinely concerned about development and the poor (or the 
economic more generally), the last thing you would study is economics. There is, to 
use the vernacular, sample selection bias in who studies what and with what results, 
with radical and critical scholarship being attracted away from economics. 
 
 Before pursuing these points further across the evolution of development 
studies (in relation to development economics), two further general remarks are 
helpful. The first concerns interdisciplinarity and a general presumption that this 
places a discipline or field such as development studies at a disadvantage in light of 
what is presumed to be parasitic dependence and dilution. This is not my own 
experience, certainly as an inevitability, and outcomes are much more complex and 
mixed, accidental even, to be reduced to such simple prognostications. Consumption 
studies, for example, over the past few decades has long been at the forefront of 
critical theory, but this did not prevent it from being unduly captured by the extremes 
of postmodernist interpretative discourse at the expense of what is now a much more 
promising attention to the material culture of consumption.6  
 
Management studies, on the other hand, might be seen to be the most self-
serving and shallow of disciplines, dictated to by powerful corporate interests and 
vocational motivation. Yet, in the UK, the organisation of Critical Management 
Studies is reputed to include one-third of all academics, had its origins in Marxist 
labour process theory, and displays a bewildering array of the most advanced and 
trendy methods and topics. This reflects the peculiarities of the timing and mode of 
forming management studies in the UK but it demonstrates the extent to which the 
strength of critical scholarship is not confined by multidisciplinarity even in the most 
unlikely fields (although I am mindful of the extent to which “distance”, intellectual 
and/or geographical, from the United States is a significant factor in both of these 
examples, and the same applies to development studies).  
 
Second, then, possibly uncontroversially, the evolution of a discipline needs to 
be placed in a broader context than in its own inner development as is brought out, 
even if in an extremely limited way, by Kuhn’s notion of paradigm as being attached 
to a community of scientists which might be broadened to encompass practitioners in 
the widest sense. In this light, especially for development studies, it makes sense to 
distinguish the role played by scholarship as such from those attached to rhetoric, 
ideology or advocacy, and policy in practice. The relationship between these is not 
necessarily one of consistency although there are connections between them, and they 
also shift over time and across topic. Further, rhetoric, scholarship and policy in 
practice are also attached to the issue of realism across all three – whether and how 
and which evidence is used. Thus, at the grand level, neo-liberalism as rhetoric has 
been about leaving things to the market; in scholarship it has ranged from neo-
classical monetarism to the mutually inconsistent neo-Austrianism; and, in practice, it 
has always been about heavy state intervention to promote private capital in general 
and finance in particular. By the same token, if overgeneralising, the shift in 
scholarship and rhetoric from Washington to Post Washington Consensus has to a 
large extent been accompanied by a hardening of the traditional Washington 
Consensus interventions.7  
 
 Now consider the rise of development studies in the period of the pre-
Washington Consensus. The contribution set by the old development economics 
offered both a standard for the prevailing orthodoxy and what was primarily a critical 
scholarship on systemic grounds as point of departure. Development studies was 
heavily influenced by the political economy of development, not least with varieties 
of dependency or world system theory to the fore, raising systemic concern over the 
causes of lack of development as well as, or even in place of, how to bring it about. 
By the same token, such political economy was significant at the very least in 
providing a backdrop to the study of non-economic issues in development, with 
modernisation as a potential critical point of departure in ranging across the social 
sciences. In retrospect, the location of the study of development outside of economics, 
especially in the United States other than in the hands of applied or heterodox 
economists or economic historians, is a telling factor in the evolution of development 
studies in the pre-Washington Consensus period. 
 
 The contrast with the Washington Consensus and subsequently is striking. 
First and foremost, and both characteristic and causal, has been the emergence of the 
new (and newer) development economics, the application of economics imperialism 
to development where previously the influence of orthodoxy was at most reflected in 
a predilection for formal methods, whether mathematical models or the search for 
empirical regularities that could be attached to development.  
 
Second has been the decline of the political economy of development through 
a pincer movement that has in general, if not universally, pushed it towards the 
margins. For the rise of the new development economics was promoted and 
accompanied by an increasing intolerance within the discipline to any heterodoxy, 
whilst development economics became less of a separate field and more of an 
application, like most other fields, of pervasive and uncritically deployed methods and 
principles. By the same token, the decline of heterodox political economy robbed the 
other social sciences of core critical economic content. This itself dovetailed with the 
rise of postmodernism, general hostility to (economic) reductionism, and emphasis on 
the discursive and its deconstruction at the expense of material realities. There was, in 
a sense, a conspiracy to fill out the analytical space through an extraordinary alliance 
around two totally incompatible approaches to subjectivity – that of neoclassical 
economics that was fixed within the individual and in meaning (utility of given 
goods) as opposed to the interpretative capacities and relativism of the knowing, 
feeling and inventive agent. 
 
Third, whilst it is totally inappropriate to look back nostalgically upon an 
unblemished golden age of the pre-Washington Consensus for which the following 
factors cannot be presumed to be absent, donor agencies, the international financial 
institutions, and especially the World Bank, have now become increasingly dominant 
in setting the agenda for development studies, if less so than for development 
economics, and have themselves increasingly set the orthodoxy from which critical 
dissent takes its points of departure. This might be seen as the form taken by, or the 
surrogate for, Americanisation of development studies as a discipline given its formal 
absence as a discipline in the United States, with pride of place being occupied by 
mainstream economics across the disciplines. Further, this has not simply been a 
matter of influencing or determining intellectual boundaries, weight and momentum, 
but has also been accompanied by the dull compulsion of incentives around publish or 
perish, policy considerations, consultancies and research grants.  
 
And the compelling motivational counterpart to such factors has been an 
increasing focus upon policy – or, more exactly, economic and social engineering as 
the goal of development studies in addressing everything from poverty to governance. 
This places critical scholarship, one that seeks to understand before, or in place of, 
intervening in a dilemma if the oppositional extreme of descent into a purely 
discursive critique is to be avoided as opposed to offering materially and systemically 
grounded proposals for alternatives (that neither border on unrealistic demands nor 
idealise the popular, resistance or social movements as such). Interestingly, those 
technical “engineers” of development who acknowledge the political role of their 
interventions have necessarily found themselves isolated, not only from orthodoxy for 
its wishing not to raise such issues, but also from critics who wish to raise nothing 
else, Biggs (2008) for an interesting personal account. In other words, the World Bank 
has increased both its influence on the social science of development and the 
influence of such social science (and economics within it) on development thinking. 
This has been at the expense of practitioners on the ground, in the sense of those with 
technical expertise who deliver development policy, unless these be social scientists. 
Policy debate has increasingly been about ideas, the knowledge bank, as opposed to 
delivery. 
 
Fourth, this has all been associated with the decline in interdisciplinarity in 
development studies, especially where interaction with the economic is concerned. 
The exception that proves the rule is where economics imperialism is involved. For 
this has had the effect of appropriating the economic within development economics 
as well as within development studies more generally. Where the other social sciences 
have found this unacceptable, the response has tended to be one of retreat into intra-
disciplinary concerns at the expense of the economic, especially under the influence 
of postmodernism. 
 
Fifth, what might be an exaggerated description of development studies as an 
uneven scattering across disciplines and topics, albeit with occasional concentrated 
effort and focus driven by academic or other fashions, has had the further effect of 
creating more intensive divisions and dissonance across rhetoric, scholarship, policy 
and realism. The roots for this lie primarily within the World Bank where the 
incidence of inconsistencies are pervasive, mixed and shifting but, crucially, overlaid 
by an extraordinary expansion in its activities as researcher, trainer and proselytiser, 
quite apart from seeking to lead policymaking through leverage of its own loans and 
self-appointed role as knowledge bank.8 The consequence has been that in place of the 
amorphous but at least single notion of modernisation, there has been the proliferation 
of developmental terminology, from good governance through to corruption, each 
element of which has to be critically unpicked across rhetoric, etc, to make any sense 
of what is being said or, possibly more important, being done.  
 
This is, however, to have moved past the Washington to the Post Washington 
Consensus. For the former, the rhetoric of leaving everything to the market responded 
to its own developmental failures, the missed decades, by explaining how this was the 
consequence of not adopting its policies in practice. For the PWC, it has been more of 
the same but with a more constructive gloss and state-friendly stance even if with 
preference for the market wherever possible. But, despite the foregoing, it is 
important not to overlook nor to dismiss the role played by dissent from the 
development studies community (as well as recognising the channels into which it 
was drawn).  
 
In the 1980s, two main elements in such dissent were offered by notions of the 
developmental state and adjustment with a human face. These are indicative of the 
trends we have identified. The developmental state literature has been fragmented into 
two schools, the economic and the political, with one emphasising the need for 
policies to correct, or make, market imperfections, irrespective of the politics of 
implementation; the other examining the conditions under which the state is capable 
of acting developmentally without regard to the policies themselves. On this, a more 
than creditable critique was able to be launched on the Washington Consensus, not 
least in light of the East Asian NICs. But the developmental state literature was 
already in decline by the mid-1990s, prior to the Asian financial crises, and was 
considerably outflanked by the PWC that simply ignored it and pretended to have 
invented something similar in its own watered-down and piecemeal version, Fine 
(2007c). 
 
Adjustment with a human face offered an equally commendable critical 
function along the lines of “it’s hurting and it ain’t working”, at least for the poor 
across an increasingly wide range of diverse topics. Significantly, in parallel with 
such contributions, again analytically and critically diluted by PRSPs, MDGs and the 
like, has been the impact of the work of Amartya Sen, possibly the most prominent of 
interdisciplinary economists, certainly so for development. To a large extent, though, 
this has been the result of his considerable intellectual powers and energy. His 
contributions have been mainly confined to straddling the boundaries between 
economics and (moral) philosophy. Further, the passage from social choice theory 
through famine, entitlements, capabilities, through to freedom has been marked by 
some reliance upon the analytical framework of microeconomics (or at least tensions 
between the micro and the macro), a remarkable absence of causal content, and, 
despite his work on famine, a lack of engagement with the specific and contextual 
content of the separate elements that make up entitlements, capabilities and freedom 
(with the suspicion that the entitlement approach to food, however appropriate, has 
informed a broader application). The result has been to place, in practice if not in 
principle, limits on the extent and nature of interdisciplinarity and the depth and 
breadth of critique to be found in development studies arising out of Sen’s work, Fine 
(2004b). 
 
This has been especially so for the period of the PWC and corresponding 
Comprehensive Development Framework. Within a decade of its launch, albeit with 
continuing tensions, the PWC has made remarkable strides in reconstructing the 
relationship between scholarship, rhetoric, realism and policy in practice. It remains 
crucial not to overgeneralise and homogenise across different areas. But, for the 
scholarship, the newer development economics has been extraordinarily successful in 
opening up development to mainstream economics in six distinct but complementary 
and mutually supportive ways. First, it allows a much wider set of economic issues to 
be addressed as a consequence of explanation based on market imperfections. Second, 
it allows a much wider set of non-economic issues to be incorporated in light of 
appeal to imperfect institutions. Third, the application of these principles is not 
contingent upon any detailed knowledge of development, development studies, or 
particular countries or regions other than through access to readily available data sets. 
Fourth is the expansion of such data sets and the capacity to handle them. Fifth, the 
market/institutional imperfection approach is far more palatable to other social 
scientists than the neo-liberal alternative. And, sixth, research funding has been 
increasingly associated with the World Bank both as a source of support and 
legitimisation.  
 
In case of rhetoric, and more in the purveying of knowledge and command of 
training of development professionals, the putative role of the World Bank as 
knowledge bank has been particularly prominent. It has, of course, been accompanied 
by a more state-friendly stance in principle in case potential correction of market and 
institutional failures can be demonstrated to be beneficial. But the underlying logic is 
one of promoting the market or globalisation. The extent to which this rests on a 
realistic assessment of the consequences involved, both in depth and breadth, is a 
matter of concern in light of burgeoning problems, the environment for example now 
increasingly sandwiched between limited progress on poverty (especially in Africa) 
and the threat of financial crises as the new kid on the block. And there is an equally 
cavalier attitude towards causation. Questions of power and conflict continue to be 
notable for their absence. As far as policy goes, there is little evidence to suggest that 
there has been a great deal of movement in practice from the core practices of the 
Washington Consensus, even if there is now a rationale for piece-meal and 
discretionary intervention on a wider scale where before such a rationale was denied 
in principle if not in practice, Fine et al (eds) (2001), Jomo and Fine (eds) (2006) and 
van Waeyenberge (2007). 
 5 Future Prospects 
 
This is to paint a very depressing picture of the extent to which development 
studies has been influenced by, if not succumbed to, zombieconomics. But it is neither 
a full nor, thereby, a balanced picture of the current state of play and prospects. For, 
there are a number of decisive positive features within development studies. First is its 
genuine multi-disciplinarity and, on occasion, interdisciplinarity. This means that 
development studies is irreducibly attached to methods, issues, theories and concepts 
that zombieconomics is incapable of appropriating and/or dominating. Thus, the fate 
of development studies does not lie in the hands of (development) economics but is 
dependent upon developments within other disciplines and how they impact upon the 
way in which they engage with, and contribute to, development studies whether 
deliberately or otherwise (just as the various phases of economics imperialism have 
affected development economics without that initiating intention). 
 
Second, again over generalising, there has been, across the social sciences 
other than economics, a dual retreat from the extremes of both neo-liberalism and 
postmodernism as analytical agenda-setting devices. This is apparent in the equally 
general, if not universal, interest in addressing the material realities of contemporary 
capitalism. What is the world in which we live? Significantly, the most important 
concept bearing on this issue to emerge over the last twenty years (and no longer than 
this) is globalisation. Crucially, it has been won away from its neo-liberal project (the 
state is withering away and this is a good thing) and is now attached to a bewildering 
array of studies appealing both to the systemic operation of capitalism on a world 
scale and, yet, demonstrating the continuing salience of the nation-state, its 
interventions and the importance of specificity, Fine (2004a). Inevitably, such 
developments have engendered both a renewal of interest in political economy and, to 
a greater or lesser degree, an antipathy to economics imperialism both within 
development studies and more widely.  
 
The result is that within each discipline, and across topics, the outcome is 
uncertain depending upon how the intersection of the conflicting intellectual trends 
identified is handled. The same applies to development studies and interdisciplinarity 
more generally. In this, the post Washington Consensus has very little to offer 
analytically, and in other respects, as a result of its methodological individualism 
seeking, as already indicated, to pick its way simplistically between the potential 
benefits of globalisation and its admitted downsides. But, for all his high profile on 
the issue, as representative of the post Washington Consensus, Stiglitz has had very 
little substantive to say about the systemic nature of globalisation or, indeed, about it 
at all. When confronting himself with the issue of why his advice and reasoning have 
been set aside by both the US government under Clinton and the World Bank when he 
was Chief Economist, he concludes it is due to the ideology and vested interests of 
finance. As argued elsewhere, this suggests these elements should be taken as starting 
point for continuing analysis, Fine (2007b). On the other hand, in case of social 
capital for example, as I have argued extensively, there has been an extraordinary 
degradation of social science as this concept has exploded in scope of application. 
And, as far as the World Bank and development studies are concerned, this has been 
particularly unfortunate in being at least complicit with economics imperialism, 
overlooking the systemic, and often proceeding as if globalisation, class, power, 
meaning and conflict had never been heard of, Fine (2003, 2007a, 2008b and c). 
 
Third, though, account must also be taken of the material circumstances under 
which development studies will evolve in the coming period. Although this is 
generally understood in terms of globalisation and neo-liberalism, variously 
interpreted, the defining characteristic of the current period is one of financialisation, 
Fine (2007b). It is not simply that there has been a growth and proliferation of 
financial services, but these have penetrated into, and mediate, an ever-increasing 
array of our economic and social lives. Financialisation is both in the vanguard and 
the beneficiary of privatisation, commercialisation, liberalisation, commodification, 
and so on. This is not to say that financialisation is either all-powerful or 
homogeneous in its effects. Quite the opposite which is why, for example, there 
should be a renewal of interest in Polanyi’s double movement, not least as the 
financial and other crises of the last decade or more seemingly threaten the well-being 
of developed as well as developing worlds.  
 
This also suggests that, crudely overgeneralising, neo-liberalism should be 
understood as having entered a second phase. The first is appropriately understood in 
terms of shock therapy, particularly for those developing countries undergoing 
adjustment under the Washington Consensus, and not to be confined to the transition 
economies of eastern Europe. For the intent was to release market forces, or private 
capital in general, as much as possible, and finance in particular. This first phase has 
now run its course and is giving way to a second phase with two closely related 
elements. One is to temper the worst excesses of the first phase, thereby presenting 
itself as more state-friendly and humane, the social market but the market nonetheless. 
The other is for the state to intervene to allow for the continued progress of 
financialisation. This is transparent for those who care to see in case of the 
extraordinary interventions that are being used to prop up the financial system, not 
least with huge subsidies from the state - whilst those who have suffered the damage, 
as home-owners for example, must pay the price. But also, for example, as 
privatisation has begun to falter, especially in the (poorest parts of the) developing 
world as is recognised by a World Bank apologetic for its previous dogma on the 
issue, so policy becomes a matter of the state supporting the private sector to deliver 
rather than conceding to it. The same is true of public services more generally as the 
era of user costs and subsidy elimination has given way to a stance of public-private 
partnerships, Bayliss and Fine (eds) (2008). 
 
The analytical and policy dilemmas posed for development studies by this 
situation is beautifully if inadvertently and implicitly anticipated by Sir Josiah Stamp. 
Apart from serving on the Board of the Bank of England, he was reputedly the second 
richest man in the UK in the 1930s as a result of his financial and other interests:9 
 
Banking was conceived in iniquity and was born in sin. The bankers own the 
earth. Take it away from them, but leave them the power to create money, and 
with the flick of the pen they will create enough deposits to buy it back again. 
However, take it away from them, and all the great fortunes like mine will 
disappear and they ought to disappear, for this would be a happier and better 
world to live in. But, if you wish to remain the slaves of bankers and pay the 
cost of your own slavery, let them continue to create money. 
 A moment’s reflection will reveal the striking affinity between this judgement and 
dependency theory – once replacing notions of core-periphery with those associated 
with banking versus the rest. There is not only the moral opprobrium associated with 
surplus (wealth) transfer but also the presumption of a mechanism by which such 
transfers are realised (dependency of some sort as opposed to the flick of the pen) and 
irrespective of efforts to the contrary unless they run very deep (sufficient detachment 
from the world system or abolition of right to create money). 
 
 It is not my intention to dwell here upon the strengths and weaknesses of 
dependency or world system theory but only to bear them in mind as we interrogate 
Stamp’s posture. For an example of the parallel, see Biel (2000). The promise of 
utilising finance is mirrored in the idea that, “NICs do at least represent some real 
change”, p. 190, so that, “some parts of the South could take advantage of weaknesses 
in the North’s control mechanisms and gain some degree of real autonomy”, p. 191. 
And, for taking it all back again, “the colonies were fashioned in such a way that they 
would permanently service the accumulation needs of the fully capitalist economies”, 
p. 12. Thus, “import substitution did have a flaw from capitalism’s point of view … if 
consumption of the product was local, wages would eventually have to rise to provide 
additional demand, and this would eventually contradict the whole assumption upon 
which internationalisation occurred, namely cheap labour. The development potential 
of the model was thus limited; it would work for a while, but then would have to be 
scrapped. And this is exactly what happened. At the end of the 1970s, the dominant 
forces in the world economy turned against import substitution as vigorously as they 
had once propagated it”, p. 81/2. But, whether for finance or underdevelopment, 
despite its power as metaphor on its own terms and as a starting point for investigative 
purposes, there are more questions raised than answered. First of all, for finance at 
least, the metaphor refers exclusively to the redistribution of wealth. Even so, what 
are the mechanisms by which wealth is retrieved through the capacity to create 
money? What are the implications for the nature and rate of accumulation, and the 
levels and distribution of employment and/or rewards amongst those outside the 
banking system? And what is the broader impact on social and economic 
reproduction? 
 
On these issues, Stamp’s stance is simply one of silence but they are decisive 
for the fate of development studies, and its constituent disciplines, in the coming 
period. For if, as suggested, financialisation is the defining systemic feature of the 
current period, then explicitly or implicitly by default, some stance must be taken on 
the role of finance in whatever is being addressed. This is obviously so for systemic 
study itself, not least with financial crises on the horizon, the rise of China, the 
increasing indebtedness of the United States, and so on. But Stamp, suitably refined 
and qualified, offers an investigative edge in the study of environmental controls for 
example. Is this to be another opportunity for financialisation with the bizarre 
prospect of burgeoning future trading in not producing something? To understand 
how such fetishised markets could arise with what effects, what they are and what 
they mean surely depends upon a political economy of capitalism and of finance that 
draws upon an interdisciplinarity in which development studies could and should be 
in the lead.  
 
This is especially important for policy purposes, and the analytical 
frameworks that inform policy. The sub-prime mortgage crisis has revealed not only 
how vulnerable is the global financial system in its proliferation and extension of 
interacting markets but how support for these in crisis commands government 
intervention and resources at the expense of those activities that finance is putatively 
deemed to support. To be parochial and polemical, would not the Bank of England’s 
rescue of Northern Rock have been better spent in funding the building of tens of 
thousands of homes directly? But what is true of housing and those previously 
dependent upon the sub-prime market is of much wider and general relevance to all 
other aspects of economic and social reproduction throughout the world of 
development and development studies. It is important both to emphasise the 
heterogeneous if pervasive impact of financialisation and the variety of mechanisms 
through which its incidence is felt, as well as the need to anaesthetise or isolate 
progressive interventions from its global reach. 
 
What role can political economy play within development studies as the latter 
addresses the second phase of neo-liberal financialisation? The prior question is the 
nature of the political economy to be deployed itself. This requires a judicious mix of 
both abstract theory and contingent context, with characterisation of the current period 
of contemporary capitalism combining both. Consider, for example, the work of Bob 
Brenner. The first Brenner debate on the transition from feudalism to capitalism 
centred on the significance of class conflict, and the relative importance of production 
as opposed to exchange, following the earlier Dobb-Sweezy debate. As such, the 
debate has had immediate implications for development understood in part in terms of 
how capitalist relations of production are established. The second Brenner debate is 
removed from such considerations in a number of ways. Brenner does not deal with 
development even indirectly since his pre-occupation is with a tri-partheid 
competitive conflict between US, Japanese and European (predominantly German) 
blocs of capital. This is in itself questionable given the internationalisation of 
capitalist production (and inter-affiliate trade) of multinational corporations. But 
Brenner does usefully point to the error of posing working class militancy and 
advance (for money and social wage) as the source of the malaise (slower growth, 
investment and productivity increase) in the capitalist world over the past thirty years 
in contrast to its performance over the post-war boom (when living standards were, of 
course, rising rapidly). For both militancy and rewards to labour have at most been 
limited. 
 
In rejecting class struggle between capital and labour as the immediate cause 
of the slowdown in contemporary capitalism, Brenner switches attention to intra-class 
conflict, between capitalists, as the decisive factor. In particular, he argues that 
incumbent large-scale capitals have occupied existing market demand and deterred 
new entrants and investment, including their own. The implication, if not drawn by 
Brenner himself, is that developing economies will be constrained as much if not 
more by such incumbents. This is all, however, fraught with both theoretical and 
empirical weaknesses. Theoretically, it views the restructuring (and expansion) of 
capital as contingent upon a simple process either of self-expansion within an 
individual sector or entry by new investment from another. But the restructuring of 
capital is levered by other mechanisms as well, not least acquisition and mergers as 
well as through state intervention (to the point of nationalisation during and/or 
underpinning the post-war boom). At an empirical level, Brenner would presumably 
have difficulty explaining the success of the East Asian NICs, as well as the 
extraordinary success of China that has shot to prominence since his investment 
overhang hypothesis was first put forward. Of course, as with Biel, this can be 
dismissed, or embraced, as exceptional. But as argued by Fine et al (2005), Brenner’s 
account is also shown to be wanting when shifting from (developing) country to 
sectoral level. For the steel industry, whilst exceptionally favourable to Brenner in 
principle in view of its heavy levels of fixed investment and thereby conducive to 
incumbents, has experienced extensive changes in technology, location of production, 
sourcing of markets, and emergence of new entrants.  
 
As a result, if only by way of omission, Brenner has usefully pointed to the 
significance of the levers for the restructuring of capital as underpinning the 
slowdown of accumulation. As already observed, these depend not only upon intra-
class relations between the productive capitals directly engaged but also upon the 
financial system and the state as agens of restructuring. The impact, indeed the nature, 
of neo-liberalism has been for financialisation to have substituted the expansion of 
and extension of financial markets at the expense of industrial restructuring. 
Moreover, the thrust of neo-liberalism has also been to constrain state restructuring of 
industry in deference to financial interests as well as at the expense of the more 
general role that the state can play in furnishing the economic and social provision 
that supports growth and development.  
 
In these respects, David Harvey’s work is more penetrating, especially Harvey 
(2003 and 2005). Rooted in a continuing commitment to Marxist political economy, 
he has in particular attached the fate of development to the notion of primitive 
accumulation extending it by use of the term “accumulation by dispossession”. This is 
the means by which to address a wide range of phenomena from plunder through to 
privatisation of public services. In addition, he has posited the notion of a “fix”, 
especially a spatial fix, as a way of mediating between abstract theory and concrete 
developments (the geography of underdevelopment, for example) as accumulation 
proceeds.  
 
As argued elsewhere, Fine (2006), there is no need to confine ourselves to 
spatial fix or otherwise. Presumably, there are also gender, labour, class, race, 
environmental, cultural and any other number of fixes as the preconditions for, and 
consequences of, continuing accumulation. To the extent that emphasis is placed upon 
one or another, this presumably reflects either the object of study or the judgement of 
what is of more general significance in the current conjuncture. Further, the idea that 
accumulation by dispossession, especially out of the non-capitalist world, is what 
sustains capitalism is open to an inverted interpretation. Capital accumulation is not 
dependent on accumulation by dispossession but the latter is liable to be intensified 
when accumulation through its own inner momentum is constrained. Such is the 
nature of the contemporary financial fix in which the surplus available to reward and 
to sustain financialisation is limited by the slower pace of real accumulation induced. 
Financialisation both reduces the surplus produced and appropriates more of it, 
inducing accumulation by dispossession as a reaction. Otherwise, Harvey’s 
accumulation by dispossession would appear to be a generalisation of Luxemburg’s 
discredited underconsumptionism as an explanation for imperialism in which the need 
for non-capitalist markets is perceived to be essential for capitalism. This is not to 
deny that accumulation by dispossession is both important and inevitable for 
contemporary capitalism, only that its significance cannot be derived as a sine qua 
non of capital accumulation. 
 
More constructively, the following can be posed as essential to a political 
economy of capitalism with corresponding implications for the role it can play within 
development studies, drawing on Fine (2004a). First is to incorporate an appropriate 
value theory, one which addresses issues of class, power and conflict in the context of 
capital accumulation. Marx’s value theory has been subject to intense conflict, of 
interpretation as well as of legitimacy. Paradoxically, the reasons put forward for 
rejecting Marx’s value theory – ranging over technical and quantitative issues of the 
relationship between value and price through to the more developed forms taken by 
capitalism such as monopolisation and, most recently, new technology – are precisely 
the same as those for remaining committed to it, Fine (2003b). This paradox is 
resolved once it is recognised that Marx’s value theory is concerned to identify how 
the way in which production is organised is attached both qualitatively and 
quantitatively through all other relations in capitalist society, with the commodity 
form as central alongside the creation and appropriation of surplus.  
 
Second, attention necessarily focuses on the relationship between classes and 
the state and how they resolve and sustain the conflicts associated with a system of 
accumulation? Third, as already emphasised, what is the relationship between the 
financial and industrial systems in the process of accumulation? Fourth, what are 
national differences in systems of accumulation, and how are they to be indentified 
and related to (fractions of) classes and their conflicts and reproduction? Fifth, why 
are sustained periods of economic growth punctuated by crises? Sixth, what is the 
relationship between economic and political systems and how can they be addressed 
by a genuinely interdisciplinary approach? Seventh, what is the relationship between 
economic and cultural factors? And, eighth, how do the new world order, US 
hegemony, and the factors associated with “globalisation” impact upon the prospects 
for growth and development? 
6 Lessons from South Africa in Lieu of Conclusion10 
Whilst each of these issues could be addressed at considerable length, I am 
acutely conscious of how abstract and theoretical insights also need to be grounded in 
the diversity and multiplicity of determinants in specific instances. Take the case of 
South Africa, for example. As argued elsewhere, especially Fine and Rustomjee 
(1997), the South African economy can be characterised as being dominated by a 
minerals-energy complex, MEC. What is meant by this? Although controversial as an 
approach and otherwise considered confined to a more or less distant past, the MEC is 
understood as an integral partnership between state and private capital, and an equally 
integral connection between a core set of activities around mining and energy, 
straddling the public/private divide. It offers a way of capturing the distinct nature of 
the South African system of capital accumulation in terms of its structures, relations, 
agents and processes. 
 
 In the interwar and immediate post-war period, core MEC sectors drove the 
economy, furnishing a surplus for the protection and growth and, ultimately, 
incorporation of what was initially small-scale Afrikaner capital separate from the 
core sectors. State corporations in electricity, steel, transport and so on, represented an 
accommodation across the economic power of the mining conglomerates and the 
political power of the Afrikaners. Mining capital required corresponding inputs but 
was reluctant to invest the necessary funds in case of hostile appropriation by 
Afrikaner interests which were, nonetheless, served by the revenue that could be 
extracted from the MEC albeit at the expense of provision of state corporations 
primarily serving mining and related sectors. The apartheid labour systems, involving 
migration from the southern African region to mining, and varying degrees of 
segregation within the country, were less an accommodation than a common bond. 
 
 As a result, the divisions between Afrikaner and mining capitals precluded a 
more general strategy of industrial diversification out of core MEC sectors, leading to 
a partial vacuum in intermediate and capital goods capability, a failure to accrue 
economies of scale and scope other than in core MEC sectors, and an inefficient 
consumer goods industry surviving by protection upon demand. By the 1970s, though, 
Afrikaner and mining-related capital had been sufficiently integrated for a common 
economic strategy to be adopted, as had always been the case for labour systems. But, 
with the collapse of the post-war boom and the Bretton Woods system based on gold 
at $35 per ounce, and the sharp rise in oil and energy prices, a huge premium attached 
to both gold and energy. Consequently, an industrial strategy for diversification was 
scarcely considered let alone adopted. Instead, the 1970s witnessed an extraordinary 
state-led expansion of gold and energy production. Into the 1980s, the crisis of 
apartheid also precluded a state and/or private strategy for industrial promotion. But, 
whilst the core MEC industries remained central to the economy, capital controls 
meant that profits generated internally that were not illegally transferred abroad, were 
confined to accumulation within the South African economy itself. This gave rise 
both to intensified conglomeration across the economy but, first and foremost, to the 
expansion of a huge and sophisticated financial system as cause and consequence of 
the internationally confined, but domestically spread, reach of the South African 
conglomerates with the Anglo-American Corporation in the lead. 
 
But what has happened to the MEC since the demise of apartheid? The 
interests of conglomerate capital have not been galvanised by the state for internal 
developmental purposes. On the contrary, conglomerates have successfully pressed 
for their own strategy of corporate globalisation and financialisation and, first and 
foremost, for the export of their domestic resources and control. This has governed 
the role played by the state in its macroeconomic policy, with policies more or less 
indistinguishable from those of orthodox IMF stabilisation being adopted to allow 
liberalisation of capital flows on favourable terms. It has also constrained the 
resources for, and commitment to, industrial as well as social and economic 
infrastructural development.  
 
In short, over the post-apartheid period, the economy has primarily been 
driven by allowing for the financialisation and export of domestic conglomerate 
capital, whilst continuing to draw upon the surplus that can be derived from core and 
related MEC sectors. This is all stunningly indicated by the rapid growth of the 
financial sector itself. It now accounts for one-fifth of domestic income but has 
continued to fail to mobilise and prompt appropriate funding for domestic investment, 
with forty percent of the population being without direct access to financial services at 
all. Far from finance serving development, the effect has been for it to absorb one-
fourth of what is produced with very little in return other than in speculative and 
globalised profitability. 
  From this highly abbreviated account a number of broader lessons can be 
drawn. First, value theory does allow finance to be seen other than simply as some 
other sector of the economy (as services), and the nature of those services in 
contemporary capitalism are fixed both in general and in the context of South Africa. 
But financialisation continues to depend upon the surplus that the economy can 
generate. It cannot float free from production, and this helps to explain what appears 
to be a renewal of commitment by the state in South Africa over the last few years to 
promote production around core MEC sectors.  
 
Second, the corresponding consequences for traditional and new concerns 
within development studies are conditioned by, but not reduced to, this dynamic. We 
witness, for example, the emergence of a new black elite through Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) or, more exactly, Black Elite Economic Enrichment, BEEE, 
around finance. This has been achieved primarily through the gains spun off through 
financial restructuring. It represents a (fraction of a) class in the making, one that is 
entirely dysfunctional and parasitical for development. By the same token, 
commitment to poverty alleviation whether through employment creation, industrial 
policy, or social provision is heavily constrained by the subordination of policy to 
financial imperatives. This is true not only of financial resources but also of the 
ideology of delivery and the lack of effort placed on creating the institutional capacity 
to deliver. This is not to reduce all that happens to the economics and corresponding 
vested interests attached to the MEC and its continuing evolution. Rather, whilst this 
does explain much of the thrust of developments and policy in terms of both direct 
and indirect effects, it also provides the context within which other policies are 
constrained, not least through the politics of subordinating the process of policy 
making to the hegemony of the Ministry of Finance. 
 
 Finally, this is all far from signalling the end of class and of production as 
decisive moments in contemporary capitalism as is variously argued by some, within 
development studies or otherwise, in variously pointing to the cultural, the new social 
movements, the new economy, and so on. Rather, as is most sharply evidenced by 
financial crises, how they are resolved (and who bears the burden), capitalism and 
development are grounded in systems of production. Across issues that remain the 
bread and butter for development studies - as diverse as poverty, governance, 
corruption, developmental state, protest, conflict, empowerment, and so on, let alone 
globalisation, neo-liberalism and social capital - the challenge remains to ground, 
possibly reject, these notions critically in material practices and corresponding 
analyses in which political economy plays an essential role. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
1
 For an account of economics imperialism, see Fine and Milonakis (2009). 
 2
 See also Rostow’s (1957, p. 510) stated preference for interdisciplinarity “because I 
was repelled by Marx’s economic determinism”. 
3
 Rodrik’s second principle is to sift the empirical evidence, his third is to have some 
faith in government, his fourth is to be context specific, his fifth is to prioritise, and 
his sixth is to be modest. My own experience of the Harvard team’s application of this 
approach to South Africa, with Rodrik as participant, is that most of these principles 
are observed in the breach other than the first to which should be added a seventh as 
engage in speculative and idiosyncratic reasoning, and an eighth ignore legitimising 
role, http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/161.html and Fine (2008g) for critique.  
4
 See also Agénor and Montiel (1996, pp. 11-12) for whom: 
We do not believe that economic agents in developing countries behave 
differently from those in industrial economies, in ways that are inconsistent 
with the rational optimising principle of neoclassical microeconomics; rather, 
we believe that they behave similarly to their industrial counterparts, but 
operate in a different environment. 
 
But, despite insisting that development economics requires the same analytical 
principle of the rational optimising individual, this principle is deemed not only to 
reproduce but also even to advance the cause of structuralism. For, “Many of the areas 
in which ‘orthodox’ thinking has provided much insight (has) … ironically, even 
strengthened new structuralist arguments”, p. 3. It is crucial to recognise that such 
structuralist arguments (and development economics and studies more generally) are 
being appropriated and reinterpreted within a mainstream neoclassical microeconomic 
framework. 
5
 It is significant that the efforts of Krugman and others in this vein tend to be lauded 
within regional science as a discipline as opposed to (more rounded and 
interpretative) economic and human geography itself, a significant illustration of the 
diverse outcomes within and across disciplines associated with economics 
imperialism (and of enormous importance for the prospects of development studies). 
6
 Significantly, more traditional studies of consumption, rooted in marketing studies, 
retained strong links, however conceptually impoverished, with the material in light 
of the study of the need to sell something. 
7
 See especially van Waeyenberge (2007) 
8
 See especially van Waeyenberge (2007). 
9
 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Josiah_Stamp,_1st_Baron_Stamp 
10
 The following draws upon and considerably abbreviates discussion in Fine (2008d-
f). 
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